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The availability of windfall revenues from natural 
resource exports or foreign aid potentially weakens 
governments’ incentives to design efficient tax systems. 
Cross-country data for developing countries provide 
evidence for this hypothesis, using a World Bank 
indicator of “efficiency of revenue mobilization.” Aid’s 
negative effects on the quality of tax systems are robust 
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of a larger effort in the department to make aid more effective in promoting economic development. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at sknack@
worldbank.org.  
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Access to windfall revenues from foreign aid and natural resource rents can 
reduce the dependence of governments in less-developed countries on their own 
taxpayers.  Such governments have weakened incentives to broaden the tax base, improve 
collection rates, and eliminate inefficient exemptions and corruption.  Cross-country data 
for developing countries provide evidence in this paper that rents from aid and (to a lesser 
extent) natural resource exports reduce the quality of tax systems.  Aid’s negative effects 
are robust to correcting for potential reverse causality, to changes in the sample, and to 
alternative estimation methods.  Fuel exports are also associated with lower-quality tax 
policy and administration, but this finding is somewhat sensitive to outliers.  Non-fuel 
resource exports, in contrast, show no relationship to efficiency of revenue mobilization.   
The next section summarizes previous literature related to the arguments and 
findings of this paper.  The data used in the analysis are described in section 3.  Results 
are presented in section 4.  A concluding section discusses implications for development 
and aid policy. 
 
2. Taxation, Governance and Sovereign Rents 
How governments mobilize public revenues has important implications for other 
aspects of the quality of governance.  Taxation is a key shaper of accountability 
relationships between citizens and government (OECD, 2008).   
Historically, democracy and the rule of law in Western societies evolved from 
bargaining between monarchs and economic elites over tax revenues and political and 
economic rights (e.g. Tilly, 1990).  In European warfare, rulers relying only on coercive 
  2taxation tended to lose to rivals who granted more rights to some of their subjects in 
exchange for additional revenues. 
In contemporary societies with broad-based tax systems, the implicit fiscal 
contracts between rulers and subjects take different forms.  However, it remains the case 
that paying taxes is part of an implicit exchange in which taxpayers gain political 
representation or other forms of voice over public policies and provision of public 
services (Levi, 1988).  Satisfaction with the quality of public services, and trust in 
government more generally, tend to improve taxpayer compliance (e.g. Bergman, 2002; 
Scholz and Lubell, 1998).   
Conversely, governments less reliant on domestic tax revenue are less 
accountable, responsive, and efficient (OECD, 2008: 4).  This argument is a major theme 
of the large and growing “resource curse” literature (e.g. Ross 1999).  States benefiting 
from oil and other natural resource rents tend to be less democratic (e.g. Ross, 2001), 
more corrupt (e.g. Treisman, 2007; Leite and Weidmann, 1999), and less interested in 
building state capacity for collecting taxes or providing services. 
Unfortunately for donor agencies, many of the “resource curse” arguments also 
apply to development aid.  Like resource rents, aid revenues can reduce government’s 
dependence on taxes from its own citizens, weakening its accountability to them.   
The analogy between aid and resource revenues should not be pushed too far, 
although both can be categorized broadly as “sovereign rents” that tend to receive less 
scrutiny from legislators and citizens than other revenues (Collier, 2006).  Aid potentially 
has favorable effects on governance that do not apply to resource revenues (Collier, 
2006).  Budget support from donors is often accompanied by policy conditions, including 
  3in some instances promises by the recipient to implement specific tax reforms.  Some 
technical assistance from donors is targeted at improving the effectiveness of public 
administration, including in some cases tax agencies.  If these efforts by donors are 
sufficiently effective, aid may have a positive impact on quality of tax systems. 
Empirical findings on aid and the quality of governance are somewhat mixed, in 
contrast to studies on natural resource rents that typically find adverse impacts on 
governance.  Focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa, Brautigam and Knack (2004) found 
higher aid is associated with declining quality of governance, as measured by an index of 
International Country Risk Guide indicators on bureaucratic quality, corruption, and rule 
of law.  Knack (2001) arrived at a similar conclusion for a global sample of aid 
recipients.  Both studies corrected for endogeneity of aid using country size, initial level 
of infant mortality and other instruments for aid.  Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2006) found that higher aid levels are associated with a lower likelihood of 
democratizing.  However, Knack (2004) found no impact in either direction.  Goldsmith 
(2001) reported a positive effect, despite using the same Freedom House democracy 
indicators used in Knack (2004 and Djankov et al. (2006).  Heckelman and Knack (2008) 
show that aid (corrected for endogeneity) is associated with declines in “economic 
freedom,” as measured by a widely used index constructed by Gwartney and Lawson 
(2007).  The components of this index closely reflect the “Washington Consensus” policy 
prescriptions for development. 
Examining the impacts of aid and resource rents on quality of tax systems should 
be distinguished from their impacts on “tax effort,” or tax revenues as a share of national 
income.  Numerous studies have looked at the impact of aid on tax effort, some of them 
  4using panel data.  Most of these studies have found that higher aid levels reduce tax effort 
(e.g. Remmer, 2004; Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Devarajan, Rajkumar and Swaroop, 
1999; Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu, 1998; Boone, 1996), but a few others find no effect 
or even a positive effect (e.g. Gupta, 2007).  The implications of those studies are 
unclear, in any event.  It would not be surprising, or necessarily bad policy, if 
governments choose to use at least a small part of aid to stimulate private sector activity 
by reducing tax rates.  It should concern us more, however, if high levels of aid erode the 
quality of tax systems, because recipient governments then become even more dependent 
on aid revenue (Azam, Devarajan and O’Connell, 2002).  Inefficient tax policies and 
administration are not as easily reversed as deliberate decisions regarding tax rates.  This 
study’s major contribution to this literature is to introduce a new dependent variable on 
the quality of tax policy and administration, updated annually by World Bank staff for all 
of its active borrowers.  The following section describes this indicator and other data used 
in the analysis. 
 
3. Data 
The World Bank’s “Country Policy and Institutional Assessments” (CPIA) is 
conducted annually for approximately 135 developing countries.  The CPIA includes 16 
questions, but this study uses only question 14, titled “Efficiency of Revenue 
Mobilization” (henceforth abbreviated ERM).  Ratings are determined by Bank staff 
familiar with each country, but are reviewed and sometimes revised by staff in central 
departments for consistency across countries and regions.  Assessments are on a 1 to 6 
scale, including half-point increments.  For example, a 3.5 rating would be appropriate 
  5for a country meeting some of the criteria for a rating of 3 and some of the criteria for a 
rating of 4.  The Appendix provides the full criteria considered in determining the ratings. 
The ERM criteria are equally divided between tax policy issues and tax 
administration issues.  Tax policy issues considered include breadth of the tax base, 
reliance on trade or other distortionary taxes, level of tariffs and number of rates, and 
number of exemptions and their transparency.  Tax administration issues include 
collection and compliance rates, costs of collection and compliance, complexity of tax 
laws and discretionary implementation, corruption by tax officials, and availability of 
effective appeals mechanisms.  These performance criteria are uncontroversial relative to 
other development prescriptions, reflecting a consensus view among tax professionals 
employed variously in national tax administrations, consultancy companies and 
international financial institutions, but who share membership in regional and global 
professional associations and networks such as the International Tax Dialogue (Fjelstad 
and Moore, 2008). 
Although ERM potentially ranges from 1 to 6, the minimum value for 2006 is 2 
(Equatorial Guinea), with a maximum value of 5.5.  Due to missing values on some 
variables, the minimum value in our 110-country main sample used in the analysis is 2.5 
(Central African Republic, Comoros, and Togo).  The mean value in that sample is 3.76, 
with a median of 3.5.  The sample median was also 3.5 in 1999, the first year for which 
data are available, but the mean was only 3.32, with a maximum of 5.0.  There is an 
upward trend over the intervening years, with only 12 countries experiencing ratings 
declines, 67 increases, and no change for 31 others.  This trend is consistent with the 
observations of experts on tax systems in developing countries (e.g. OECD, 2008: 14; 
  6Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008: 235-6, 259).  Among the 67 countries with increases, 38 rose 
by only a half point, 18 by a full point, 8 by 1.5 points, and 3 by two full points.  The 
correlation of ratings for 1999 and 2006 is .62 (rank correlation .61).   
Despite the extensive criteria Bank staff are supposed to use in assessing ERM, 
one might think certain objective proxies are used as shortcuts, e.g. tax revenues as a 
share of national income (“tax effort”) or trade taxes as a share of revenues.  These 
variables are in fact both significantly related to ERM ratings, but together they explain 
only about one-sixth of the variation in ERM.  Alternatively, as is potentially the case for 
any subjective governance indicator, quality of tax policy and administration could be 
inferred merely from per capita income levels or recent growth rates.  However, income 
(2006) and growth (1999 to 2006) together explain only 22% of the variation in ERM.  
These results are consistent with the supposition that staff assessments of ERM take into 
account the broader criteria in the questionnaire as intended.
1 
The dependent variable used in the empirical analyses below is the 2006 ERM 
ratings.  We test the impact of sovereign rents over the period 1999-2005, controlling for 
initial (1999) ERM ratings.
2  The key independent variables of interest are aid and natural 
resource revenues. 
Aid is measured by "official development assistance" (ODA) as a percentage of 
gross national income (GNI), using data for the years 1999-2005 from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.  These data were originally collected by the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee from each donor agency.  Aid (ODA) includes 
                                                 
1 Internally, staff provide written justifications for all ERM ratings.  Some justifications are more 
comprehensive and relevant than others, but in general they show that staff take the questionnaire criteria 
very seriously in their assessments.  
2 Annual variation in the data is not used, because effects of aid and resource rents may show up only with 
substantial lags. 
  7grants, and loans with a grant element of more than 25 percent.  This definition excludes 
most IMF lending, and a substantial share of World Bank lending, which goes to middle-
income borrowers charged near-market rates of interest.   
Following standard practice in the empirical literature on natural resource rents, 
we proxy for these using fuel exports as a share of gross national income, and a similar 
measure for exports of ores and metals.  As with aid/GNI, we average these values for the 
1999-2006 period for which ERM data are available. 
Control variables used in one or more tests include the initial (1999) ERM value, 
log of initial (1999) income per capita, average annual per capita income growth over the 
1999-2005 period (based on purchasing power parity income data from the World 
Development Indicators), and political rights.  Table 1 shows summary statistics for the 
instruments and other variables, for the 100-country main sample used in the analysis. 
 
4. Analysis 
The first column of Table 2 presents results of OLS estimation using a simple 
specification.  The impact of aid, fuels and metals on ERM is tested controlling only for 
initial (1999) ERM values.  Aid and fuels both have negative and statistically significant 
coefficients, consistent with the hypothesis that the availability of sovereign rents 
weakens incentives to improve tax policy and administration.  These impacts are fairly 
modest in size: an increase in aid’s share of GNI by about 26 percentage points, or an 
increase in fuel exports’ share of GNI of about 60 percentage points, are each associated 
with a half-point reduction in the 1-6 ERM scale.  The impact of aid is also larger than 
for fuels when measured in standard deviation units.  A standard-deviation increase in aid 
  8and in fuel exports are associated with reductions in ERM of one-fifth and one-seventh of 
a standard deviation respectively.  Exports of ores and metals show no relationship with 
ERM.  Not surprisingly, the strongest predictor of 2006 ERM ratings is lagged ERM 
values. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 report results from median and robust regression 
techniques respectively, that reduce the influence of outlying values.  Coefficients for aid 
and fuel exports are virtually unchanged, but statistical significance is reduced somewhat 
in column 3, particularly for fuel exports. 
In the sample ERM takes on one of seven different values and is technically an 
ordinal rather than interval measure.  Each half-point increment in value indicates a more 
efficient tax policy and administration, but an increase from (say) 3 to 3.5 are not 
necessarily equivalent in any meaningful sense to an increase from 3.5 to 4.  Column 4 
therefore reports results from ordered probit estimation.  Coefficient signs and 
significance levels in column 4 are very similar to those in column 1, using OLS.  
Therefore, treating ERM as a cardinal rather than an ordinal variable in most of the 
analyses presented in this paper appears to be an innocuous assumption. 
The tests in Table 2 are intended as an initial relatively simple analysis.  They 
show that significant findings on two key indicators of sovereign rents are not dependent 
on the inclusion of a particular elaborate set of control variables.  On the other hand, one 
could argue those tests assume too much by omitting more controls, and by treating 
sovereign rent indicators as exogenous.  Subsequent tests reported in Tables 3 and 4 
respond to those concerns. 
Several control variables are added in these subsequent tests.  Including initial 
  9(1999) per capita income (purchasing power adjusted) and average annual growth (1999-
2005) should capture any tendency for (subjective) assessments of ERM to be inferred in 
part from observed economic performance.  The likelihood of reforms in tax policy and 
administration could also be related to economic performance; e.g. if tax reforms are 
sometimes motivated by crisis as reflected in slow growth.  Income may also proxy for 
structural variables (e.g. agricultural, manufacturing and service share of GNI, or 
urbanization
3) that potentially could influence tax revenues or policies.  The coefficient 
estimates for income and growth will reflect the net impact of these various influences on 
ERM. 
We control for the initial level of democracy, and for its change over the period, 
using the well-known Freedom House ratings on political freedom.  Democratic 
institutions could create more pressure on elected officials to produce fair and efficient 
tax legislation, and on tax officials to collect revenue in more transparent and honest 
ways.  However, it is conceivable that electoral majorities could vote to narrow the tax 
base and exploit a small set of revenue sources.  Organized producer groups in 
democracies may also lobby for exemptions and other special treatment.  The net impact 
of political freedoms on ERM is therefore ambiguous. 
Aid, one of the key independent variables, is potentially endogenous, as donors 
may direct either more or less aid toward reforming countries.  In fact, the purpose of the 
CPIA ratings is to allocate the World Bank’s IDA funds, which account for about 10% of 
all ODA.  The premise of this “performance-based allocation” system is that aid is more 
effective in more favorable policy environments, as argued in World Bank (1998).  This 
                                                 
3 When those variables are included in the regressions they are not significant, and have little or no impact 
on results for the sovereign rents variables. 
  10relationship creates a positive bias in the impact of (some) aid on ERM.
4   
To correct for this or other possible sources of endogeneity, we instrument for aid 
using two-stage least-squares.  Exogenous instruments include initial (1995) levels of 
infant mortality, population (with data from the World Development Indicators), and a set 
of regional dummy variables.
5  Higher infant mortality is an indicator of low 
development and greater need for aid as likely perceived by donors.  Population reflects 
national prestige interests of donor countries: donors tend to spread their aid across many 
recipients to establish a presence, just as they have an embassy in every country.  This 
donor behavior results in higher aid levels (on a per capita basis, or as a share of national 
income) for smaller recipient countries. 
Table 3 (column 1) reports results for the first-stage regression, with aid/GNI 
averaged over 1999-2005 as the dependent variable.  The excluded instruments infant 
mortality and population are both significant predictors of aid levels, and in the expected 
directions.  The regional dummies are jointly significant at the .05 level.  Collectively, 
these instruments explain a sizeable fraction of the variation in aid.  As seen by 
comparing the two columns in Table 2, the other second-stage regressors explain 50% of 
the variation in aid in the absence of the exogenous instruments.  With their inclusion, 
67% of the variation in aid is explained. 
Fuel exports are also potentially endogenous to ERM.  For example, distortionary 
tax policies could reduce incentives to invest in manufacturing or services, reducing GNI 
                                                 
4 However, allocations do not always translate one-to-one into aid commitments, and commitments in turn 
do not always translate one-to-one into disbursements.  Aid is measured as actual disbursements in the 
empirical analysis. 
5 Regions follow the World Bank’s groupings: Sub-Saharan Africa (the omitted category), East Asia and 
Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and 
South Asia.  
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is beyond the scope of this paper, as it is more difficult to find plausible instruments with 
sufficient explanatory power for fuel exports in contrast to aid.  Results for fuel exports 
are somewhat weaker than for aid, in Table 2 and in subsequent tests.  Correcting for a 
negative endogeneity bias of the sort described above could be expected to further 
weaken results on fuel exports.  Coupled with the non-significant effects of ores and 
metals exports, aid in this analysis turns out to be the key measure of sovereign rents with 
implications for efficiency of tax policy and administration. 
The first column of Table 4 reports 2SLS results for the 110-country main sample 
used in Table 2.  The exogenous component of aid has a negative and significant 
coefficient that is double the magnitude from OLS estimates (in Table 2, column 1).  
Each increase of about 13 percentage points in aid/GNI is associated with a half-point 
reduction in ERM. 
Aid results are also highly robust to changes in the sample.  Equation 2 of Table 4 
shows that the effects of aid are little changed by dropping the seven countries with fuel 
exports exceeding 30% of GNI.
6  The coefficient of fuel exports, however, declines 
markedly (in absolute value) and becomes insignificant.  Equation 3 shows that results 
for aid are also robust to dropping the 10 countries with aid exceeding 10% of GNI.
7  Nor 
are results sensitive to dropping instead the 16 countries with per capita (PPP-adjusted) 
income in 1999 exceeding $8000.   
Equation 5 reports the most dramatic change in the sample, dropping the 36 
                                                 
6 These seven countries are Algeria, Azerbaijan, Gabon, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, and 
Yemen.  
7 These ten countries are Burundi, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Kiribati, Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Rwanda and Zambia. 
  12countries with aid averaging below 1% of national income between 1999 and 2005.  The 
aid coefficient and significance remains largely unchanged; higher aid levels impair 
efficiency of revenue mobilization even among the restricted sample of countries 
receiving substantial amounts of aid.  In equations 3-5, fuel exports are also associated 
with lower ERM ratings.   
Equation 6 drops the natural resource variables, to add 16 countries to the sample 
that are missing data on them.  Aid remains negatively and significantly related to ERM 
in this expanded sample. 
Two additional findings are not shown in tables, for space reasons.  A possible 
alternative to using 2SLS to correct for endogeneity of aid to ERM might be to net out 
the World Bank’s IDA aid, or to include it in the tests but only as a separate variable.  
This is only a partial solution to endogeneity, however, because other donors could also 
direct aid to countries improving its tax or other policies, even if there is no formal 
allocation rule for doing this as with IDA.  In any event, in OLS tests (as in Table 2, 
equation 1) the coefficient on IDA aid is near 0 and insignificant, and the coefficient on 
non-IDA aid is negative and significant.   
Finally, one could also make a case for excluding technical assistance (TA) from 
aid in the tests, because much of it does not augment resources available to recipient 
governments, but is spent instead on consultants who are selected by donor agencies and 
who often live and work in developed nations.  Accordingly, separate variables were 
created for TA and for all other aid, in a 2SLS test as in Table 4, treating both aid 
variables as endogenous.  The coefficient on TA in this test is positive and insignificant, 
while the coefficient on all other aid remains negative and significant. 
  135. Discussion 
Results from this study indicate that high aid levels tend to undermine the quality 
of tax policy and administration, potentially aggravating long-run dependence on foreign 
aid to finance public expenditures.  Inefficient tax systems can also reduce the level and 
productivity of private investment, slowing growth in incomes.  Results for natural 
resource rents were not as robust as for aid.  However, to the extent dependence on fuel 
exports also makes tax systems less efficient, negative effects on private investment and 
growth can be expected, as in aid-dependent countries.   
The stronger results for aid rents than for resource rents appears inconsistent with 
Collier’s (2006: 1485) conclusion that aid is better than oil:  
Like resource rents, aid reduces the need for taxation and so increases 
sovereign rents [relative to “scrutinized revenues”].  However, offsetting this, 
aid comes with various donor-imposed mechanisms of scrutiny, which may 
spill over onto other expenditures, and so substitute for reduced pressure 
from citizens. 
 
A possible explanation for this inconsistency is that available data more 
accurately measure aid rents than resource rents flowing to governments.  Aid data 
compiled by the OECD-DAC are far from perfect, but they capture most aid, and most 
aid recorded as going to a recipient country is spent by its government, including even 
most aid that never enters government budgets.  Natural resource exports are a relatively 
poor measure of resource rents.  Production costs cannot be netted out very accurately.
8  
Total revenues from resource sales may exceed export revenues by a substantial margin 
in some countries.  If resource rents are measured less accurately in the analysis, 
estimates of their impact on quality of tax systems may be less accurate than estimates for 
                                                 
8 Hamilton and Clemens (1999) construct estimates of natural resource rents for 1985-94, prior to the 
period covered in this study.  They outline a number of limitations to their methods. 
  14aid. 
A second possible explanation for the disparity is uncertainty regarding the 
different revenue streams.  Prices for oil and other natural resources are volatile, so 
government decision makers may rationally discount future resource revenues more than 
they do future aid flows.   
A third explanation is the difference in dependent variables.  Collier’s conclusion 
that aid is more conducive than resource rents to development is based on evidence from 
growth regressions, not from analyses of the quality of tax systems.  Collier 
acknowledges that “a priori either mode of transfer [aid or resource revenues] could be 
associated with superior development outcomes” as procedures and conditions imposed 
by donors can undermine institutional effectiveness (Collier, 2006: 1483).  Aid revenues 
may be superior for some outcomes such as growth but at the same time be more 
damaging to other outcomes, such as quality of tax systems.  Aid is often linked to policy 
conditions, including tax-related conditions in some cases, but there is a consensus in the 
aid effectiveness literature that policy conditions are ineffective (e.g. Dreher, 2008; 
Collier, 1997). 
It is important to distinguish between aid’s impact on the quality of tax systems 
from the net impact of all donors’ activities, including policy advice not linked in any 
way to aid flows.  As mentioned above, there is an upward trend in ERM ratings that is 
consistent with impressionistic evidence of specialists in the tax field (OECD, 2008; 
Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008).  While tax reform trends reflect a professional consensus on 
efficiency and revenue collection goals and the means of achieving them, this agenda has 
been led by the international financial institutions, in particular the IMF (OECD, 2008).  
  15The net impact of donors’ aid flows and policy advice on quality of tax policy and 
administration may well be positive. 
Realistically, development aid and natural resource revenues are likely to remain 
at high levels for the foreseeable future.  How can their adverse impacts on the quality of 
governance be minimized in less-developed countries?  There are several approaches.  
Birdsall and Subramanian (2004) suggest distributing oil revenues in Iraq and elsewhere 
directly to the people.  Similarly, Easterly (2002) proposes that donors bypass 
governments more frequently, with cash grants to poor people, and delivering more aid 
through NGOs and private firms.  Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle (2006) advocate 
directing more aid to regional and global public goods such as agricultural research or 
anti-malarial research.  Finally, Moore (2007) forcefully argues for more revenue reform 
projects by donors in aid recipient nations, noting that “provision of large aid volumes 
without taking steps to encourage the expansion of (efficient) domestic revenue-raising 
capacity in the long term is irresponsible.” 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for 110-country main sample 
 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Revenue mobilization rating, 2006  3.76 0.59  2.5 5.5
Revenue mobilization rating, 1999  3.32 0.74  2.0 5.0
Aid/GNI (%)  5.87 6.84  -0.03 30.50
Fuel exports/GNI 1999-2005 (%)  5.11 10.13  >0.01 48.7
Metals & ores exports/GNI, 1999-2005 (%)  2.38 5.33  >0.01 33.5
GDP per capita, PPP, 1999  4332 3257  508 16055
Avg. annual growth in GDP per capita, 1999-2005  0.79 1.69  -6.5 15.8
Political rights, 1999  3.55 1.95  1 7
Change in political rights, 1999-2006  -0.07 1.05  -3 +3
Infant mortality, 1995 (per thousand)  53.98 36.05  5.8 176
Population, 1999 (millions)  4.26 15.40  0.04 1250
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Dependent variable is CPIA “Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization” (ERM) rating for 
2006.  Test statistics (from robust standard errors) are in parentheses.  Sample size is 110.  
Mean of dependent variable is 3.76. 
  21Table 3 
















































































































































  22Dependent variable is mean aid/GNI, 1999-2005.  T-statistics (from robust standard 
errors) are in parentheses.  Sample size is 110.  Mean of dependent variable is 5.9%.  
Sub-Saharan Africa is the omitted regional category. 
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Dependent variable is CPIA “Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization” rating for 2006.  Test 
statistics (from robust standard errors) are in parentheses.  Estimates are from 2SLS.  
First-stage regression for main sample is shown in Table 2.  Overid test statistic is 
Hansen’s J. 
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Definition of dependent variable 
Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization 
This criterion assesses the overall pattern of revenue mobilization--not only the 
tax structure as it exists on paper, but revenue from all sources as they are actually 
collected. Separate sub-ratings should be provided for (a) tax policy and; (b) tax 
administration. For the overall rating, these two dimensions should receive equal 
weighting. 
1  a.  Tax base is extremely narrow with many open-ended exemptions. Most tax revenues are collected from 
foreign trade and other distortionary taxes. There are high, multiple, and widely ranged import tariffs, 
which change frequently or are applied in a highly discretionary manner. Little is collected from income 
taxes. 
b.  Tax administration is extremely weak, with very low collection rates. It is organized by type of tax and 
business processes have not been reviewed and reformed. Computerization is limited to very basic 
functions. Many taxpayers must make several or more personal visits to tax offices. Corruption is endemic 
among tax and customs officials.  
2  a.   Tax system is poorly designed, with a narrow base and many open-ended exemptions. Taxes on foreign 
trade, turnover taxes and other distortionary taxes are the dominant source of revenue. There are high and 
multiple import tariffs. Both company and personal income taxes have high rates on a very narrow base and 
generate little revenue.  
b.  Tax administration is weak due to complex laws, poor information systems, corruption, weak capacity and 
political interference. Collection rates are low. Tax obligations are negotiable rather than rule-based. 
Appeals and other dispute resolution mechanisms have not been developed. 
3  a.  Taxes on trade are the dominant source of revenue; turnover and other distortionary taxes and levies 
remain. Consumption based taxes (e.g., a VAT) are planned or in limited use. Import tariffs are moderate, 
but there are too many rates.  Income tax base is narrow and the rate structure is only partly rationalized.  
b.  Tax administration is weak, but tax laws are not inordinately complex, and information systems are 
functioning (e.g., unique taxpayer identification numbers used). Corruption exists, but there are efforts to 
improve integrity as well as capacity. 
4  a.  A significant amount of revenue is being generated by low-distortion taxes such as retail sales/VAT, 
property, etc. VAT has not been fully operational to include activities at the retail stage. Non-trivial 
amounts of revenue are generated from company and personal income taxes. Tax base is broad and 
exemptions are moderate and made time-bound, especially for promotion schemes. Trade taxes have few 
and low rates.  
  b.  Tax administration is solid, cost of revenue generation has been reduced and there are relatively few cases 
of corruption and political interference. Eligibility for preferential rates and exemptions is largely 
transparent. 
5  a.  The bulk of revenues are generated by low-distortion taxes such as sales/VAT, property, etc. Import tariffs 
are low and relatively uniform, and export rebate or duty drawback are functional. There is a single 
statutory corporate tax rate comparable to the maximum personal income tax rate. Tax base for major taxes 
is broad and free of arbitrary exemptions.  
b.  Tax administration is effective, and entirely rule-based. Administrative and compliance costs are low.  A 
taxpayer service and information program, and an efficient and effective appeals mechanism, have been 
established.   
 
6    Criteria for “5” on both sub-ratings are fully met.  There are no warning signs of possible deterioration, and 
there is  widespread expectation of continued strong or improving performance. 
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